Care, Contact and Deprivation of Liberty: Lessons from the Fiennes story and the post-AGNI world
Recent press speculation regarding the wellbeing of the explorer Sir Ranulph Fiennes has highlighted some common misunderstandings on the part of the press and public around the law on Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS).
Fiennes, who was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2020, appointed his wife to make health and welfare decisions on his behalf under a Lasting Power of Attorney. Earlier this year, Fiennes’ relatives wrote to the Office of the Public Guardian expressing concern for his wellbeing, claiming that he had been cut off from his friends and family.
A statement from Cheshire police, quoted by the press, reported no safeguarding concerns at the time, and that they were “satisfied that Sir Ranulph Fiennes is living in an appropriate setting with suitable care and professional oversight”. Nevertheless, his friends and relatives claim that Fiennes has spent over a year living in a succession of care homes under assumed names, and that attempts to check in on him have been rebuffed by Fiennes’s wife. It is understood that he has now returned to live in his marital home with his wife.
Behind the headlines, there are often complex situations that should remain private, even if they concern high profile individuals.
Fiennes may have asked his wife to keep his friends (and indeed the media) at a distance in order to respect his dignity as his health declines and to keep him out of the public eye. We also do not know if he chose to move to a care home, or if he could be cared for at home.
No relative, whether they are acting as Attorney, Deputy, or next of kin, has the right to prevent contact between a vulnerable person and their friends and relatives if the person wants contact, or if contact is in their best interests.
If contact with Fiennes was blocked while he was in the care home, then his case could have been brought to the Court of Protection. But the key point here is that it is not clear what Fiennes’s wishes are or were.
Media speculation without the full details can often fail to consider the complex nuances of a difficult situation. More than one newspaper reported a care home assertion that Fiennes’ wife failed to produce the documents authorising his deprivation of his liberty. However, this is not her legal responsibility. It is the care home’s duty to seek a DoLS authorisation if the criteria are met and Social Services’ duty to decide whether to grant this authorisation.
The AGNI Supreme Court judgment from June 2026 fundamentally changed the nature of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR.
The previous “acid test” for identifying what amounts to a deprivation of liberty was established under the 2014 case known as “Cheshire West”. This set out what amounted to a deprivation of liberty: that if a person’s detention was attributable to the state, the person was under continuous supervision and control, and was not free to leave. The deprivation would need to be authorised and if the person or their representatives were unhappy with the care and residence arrangements, perhaps because they wanted to return home, this would trigger the right for the person’s case to be put before the Court of Protection for a Best Interest decision to be made.
Under the new AGNI criteria, all of the objective and subjective circumstances about a person’s residence, care and support must now be considered to assess whether there is a deprivation of liberty. This includes looking at the “relative normality” of the placement.
A person who lacks capacity to make decisions about their residence and care arrangements can give subjective consent to what would otherwise be a deprivation of liberty. So, if they are expressing that they are happy/content with the arrangements, this can be viewed as tacit consent.
This is a marked change from the previous test, and it is anticipated that far fewer people will meet the deprivation of liberty criteria, resulting in a reduction of DoLS authorisations being required. It is possible that under the new rules, Fiennes’ care arrangements would no longer have amounted to a deprivation of his liberty if he was not objecting to them, even if his friends and relatives thought he should be at home.
For professionals acting as property and affairs Deputy to vulnerable adults, the recent review of the Lumb cases (“In the Matter Of (Re Direct Payments)”, which further clarified the case of Re: ACC), will make getting involved in contact or care arrangement matters for their client without Court authority even less attractive. Such matters may appear not to be the Deputy’s concern but if such contact restrictions come to their notice, the duty to act in P’s best interests would make it a responsibility to report concerns to the social care professionals involved and if no action is taken, to the Court of Protection
The key thread running through such cases is that the wishes of P, the vulnerable adult, must be considered and that the Best Interests process must be followed.
Speculation about the wellbeing of Sir Ranulph Fiennes often misses the fundamental question: what are his own personal wishes regarding his care and accommodation? Without knowing this, an important part of the story is missing, and the rest is just press speculation.
For expert advice on Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, contact our Court of Protection and Community Care Law team on 01273 609911, or email info@ms-solicitors.co.uk.
